

Third Edition

Collective Behavior

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Chapter 12

Social Movements: Nature and Approaches

Social movements are complex and diverse. Broad movements for reform typically combine political with life-style objectives, like the nineteenth century American movement for the abolition of slavery, the nineteenth and twentieth century women's suffrage movement and the current women's movement, the international peace movement, the environmental movement, the antinuclear power movement, anti-pornography movements, and the anti-abortion (right to life) movement. In each case, movement goals included both enactment of legislation (political objective) and changed personal attitudes and practices in daily life (life-style objectives). Many movements are narrower in scope, like the concerted effort of Appalachian miners after 1968 to secure workman's compensation for black lung disease contracted in the mines; a continuing movement to forestall oil drilling in a southern California beach community; a movement begun in 1980 to reduce drunken driving by imposing stiffer legal penalties and better enforcement of the law; the movement for home birthing (favoring midwives over physicians in normal deliveries); and a movement in the state of Washington to promote public education and legislation on geologic hazards such as earthquakes, landslides, and volcanic eruptions.

Most movements combine *humanitarian* and *interest-group* themes in their objectives (see also Chapter 2). Humanitarian or altruistic themes promote the general welfare (as the adherents conceive it) or the well-being of some disadvantaged group. *Interest-group* themes advance the interests of the movement's constituencies. Besides the black lung movement and the local movement against oil drilling, other examples of movements with strong interest-group themes are nationalistic move-

ments such as the American revolutionary movement and colonial independence movements around the world; recent American black nationalism, Chicano and other ethnic nationalisms, and the Marcus Garvey "Back to Africa" movement of the 1920s; class-based movements such as industrial and farm labor movements; age-group movements such as old age pension movements that flourished in the 1930s and 1940s and the student movements of the 1960s; and regional movements like the Dixiecrat movement of 1948 to mobilize southern regional political power.

Movements may operate within the established system, be it political, religious, or cultural, or they may attack the system. The Polish workers' movement known as Solidarity that began in 1980 challenged political authorities with crippling strikes, but generally walked a tightrope to avoid revolutionary challenge. The French Revolution of 1789 and the Iranian revolution of 1979, in contrast, overthrew and transformed established regimes. Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland, while unable to overthrow British rule, continually disrupts it by using guerilla tactics. The short-lived Symbionese Liberation Movement whose members kidnapped the daughter of a prominent California newspaperman in 1974 and the Weather Underground that developed as a radical spin-off from the 1960s New Left movement similarly attacked the American political and economic system by using guerilla tactics. Again, both reform and revolutionary themes are often found in the same movement, and the course of events and response to the movement determine which become dominant.

The New Left was an important but diffuse movement of the 1960s, already briefly discussed in Chapter 11. It combined many of the

characteristic features of broad social movements for political and life-style transformation. There was constant internal tension over whether it should work primarily within the American political system or by disruption of that system. The history of the New Left provides a useful case study in the rise, transformation, and decline of a diffusely idealistic movement, characterized by both internal and external conflict.

The New Left

From about 1962 to 1970, the New Left mobilized vast numbers of young people, especially students. In the political arena the New Left opposed not only right wing politics but also both the liberal tradition of Presidents Roosevelt and Kennedy and traditional socialist and communist movements. Participation in the southern *sit-ins*, organized to dismantle the system of racial segregation, was the incubating experience. Beginning in 1960, sensitive white students were brought together with blacks in a setting that encouraged a widely ranging critical assessment of contemporary American society and inspired faith in the possibilities for achieving radical reform through sophisticated political activism. By 1962 many of the students who had been active in peace and civil rights movements joined forces to create the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and draft a platform known as the Port Huron Statement. Through practices known as participatory democracy, and by fostering coalitions with civil rights and peace movements and with revitalized liberal and labor movements, the New Left sought to gain political power. Their central political aim was to break the stultifying hold of the "military-industrial complex" on American society.

Besides addressing specific problems such as racism, cold-war militarism, and poverty, the New Left sought a pervasive democratization and humanization of American society, requiring both political and life-style changes. At its height the New Left mobilized thousands of young people to work among the poor to promote grass-roots political effectiveness, and stimulated student activism in universities and colleges throughout the nation. By 1965 the accelerating Viet Nam war and the threat of being drafted into combat service added a component of age-group self-interest to humanitarian concerns for many of the movement adherents.

Since the aim was to win over significant segments of the liberal establishment, the prevailing New Left strategy employed nonviolent and "legitimate" forms of protest. But more often than not, these tactics were treated as illegitimate by police and other authorities and viewed as disruptive and un-American by the general public. The media promoted confusion between the New Left and the earlier "hippie" drug culture of San Francisco's Haight Ashbury district, and with orthodox communism. The openness of the movement to adherents of many kinds, and the prevalent attack on traditionally sacred sexual mores, gender roles, and marriage patterns fostered such confusions. Polarization between the movement and "authorities" reached a peak with the violent encounters between New Left demonstrators and Chicago police in connection with the 1968 Democratic nominating convention. The liberal establishment rejected New Left initiatives and, as Richard Flacks observed, "By the SDS convention of 1969, the organization had split into bitterly hostile and contending factions."¹

The movement as a social unit no longer exists. But it had substantial impact in many realms and may have contributed to what the French author Jean-Francois Revel called a revolution in life style and values in American society.² The enduring influence was evident in many of the policies followed by California's Governor Jerry Brown who held office from 1974 to 1982, but failed in his campaign for election to the U.S. Senate in 1982. New Left philosophy formed much of the foundation for Thomas Hayden's League for Industrial Democracy which became a force in California politics in the late 1970s.

Lacking the strong political theme of the New Left are movements of the spirit and self-help movements of many sorts. New religious movements have been a recurring feature of American history, and all of the conventional religious denominations began this way. In the following selection Roy Wallis describes briefly three of the contemporary movements most popular in England, the United States, and around the world. Later we shall ask when such groups are correctly included under the rubric of social movement. But for the present they provide us with a glimpse of another portion of the spectrum of social movements.

Varieties of Psychosalvation

Roy Wallis

... [By the term *psychosalvation*] I mean the religious and secular movements and groups which have emerged in the last 25 years or so to offer theories, techniques and settings for individual psychological or psycho-spiritual development, and "self-realisation." They have flowered most extravagantly in California. But increasingly they have spread throughout America, western Europe and Australasia.

Here, I shall look at some of the social conditions and background to the emergence and growth of these movements. Beyond those already mentioned, they also include the Maharishi's now passé Transcendental Meditation; encounter groups, which achieved their heyday in the late 1960s; and other more recent variants, like Primal Scream Therapy, Biofeedback, Silva Mind Control, Arica and latest of all, Insight, now being promoted in London by Bernard Levin and Arianna Stassinopoulos.

Probably the most familiar psychosalvation movement is still Transcendental Meditation. TM was first brought to the west by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi in 1959. Originally presented as a *spiritual* movement in the Hindu tradition, it has become more and more secular, making little reference to God or a spiritual realm, except in notions like "cosmic consciousness," which it retains. It preserves the Hindu traditions explicitly only in the initiation ceremony, in which individuals receive their *mantra*. If you meditate on the *mantra* it will (it is claimed) reduce stress. This will lead to a decline in crime, an increase in world harmony, an end to industrial conflict and war, improved resistance to disease, and increased productivity.

Like many psychos salvational movements, TM offers an instant, labour-saving solution to its clients' problems. Two preliminary talks, an initiation ceremony; and then effortlessly (it is stressed), peace and serenity will develop; your intelligence will be put to better use; and greater insight, tolerance and fuller realisation of your human potential, will result—all by practising the meditative technique twice daily for only 20 minutes a time. And for a mere £40 or £50 (sometimes even less for students or the elderly). Re-

cently, in the face of a declining clientele, TM has begun to diversify its product. It offers a much more expensive course of instruction in, of all things, levitation.

Scientology has been a rather more controversial form of psychosalvation. Some of its leading officers (including the founder's wife) have just been sentenced to imprisonment in the U.S. on charges relating to theft, and conspiracy to steal numerous documents from federal offices in Washington and elsewhere, including the Department of Justice itself.

Scientology began life around 1950 as Dianetics. This was an alleged science of the mind, with an associated technique for eliminating all impediments to achieving maximum mental operating efficiency. This was held to be vastly beyond the level at which we currently operate. Essentially, the technique involved re-living early traumatic incidents of pain or loss, including those alleged to have taken place in early life within the womb.

Scientology developed this early theory to include a spiritual element and a theory of reincarnation. The practice underwent radical changes. It brought in a wide range of mental exercises, and particularly the use of the E-meter, an electro-psychogalvanometer related to the lie detector. Unlike TM, *Scientology* offers an extremely wide range of activities and levels to achieve—with its help. Extensive participation, therefore, requires the payment of continuing, increasingly expensive fees.

est (the lower-case initials are an affectation used by the movement, even at the beginning of sentences) began in 1971, under Werner Erhard. It uses elements drawn from many other related movements. Its theory seems to rely heavily on Scientology. But in other respects, it is quite unlike it. *est* offers one basic commodity: a very intensive programme for a relatively short time. This is normally given on two week-ends, with 15 or 16 hour session on each of the four days, at a cost of \$150 plus VAT. During these sessions, the 250 "trainees" sit in straight-backed chairs arranged in rows. They are lectured and hectorated; instructed in "processes" which mainly involve guided fantasy, like the one which I began this article; and invited to "share" the results.

They may question or challenge any part of the lectures and instructions, but then are usually roundly attacked if they do so, and covered with obloquy. The room in general, and challenging individuals in particular, are called "ass-

holes"; they are assured of their absolute and pitiable ignorance. The training concludes, however, with trainees being informed that they are the gods in their universe, and are perfect as they are

What common features, if any, do these movements have? They share the idea that man is "perfectible." People have a potential far beyond their current level of functioning. The key to attaining it lies in transforming *individuals*, not society.

Moreover, this transformation is considered possible by means of techniques and theories which can be quickly transmitted and learned. The theory and practice are essentially individualistic. The source of suffering, of disability, of unhappiness, lies inside oneself. By a simple technique, or set of beliefs and practices, difficulties can be eradicated. As far as some movements are concerned, the potential "to be realised" is almost limitless.

The achievement of this potential, whatever spiritual benefits it may have, will also have certain mundane benefits. Followers of such movements may object to some limited aspects of the present social order, but normally accept its values and goals.

Intelligence will be increased, social capabilities immeasurably improved, psychosomatic illnesses and psychological disabilities eliminated, and the individual's sense of well-being and self-satisfaction greatly increased. These movements are often hostile to rational evaluation. They see this as a defense against (or barrier to) feeling and experience. They emphasize *the present*

Four ideas are central to the beliefs and ethos of these movements.

There is, first, the idea of *individual achievement*. Underlying much of the rhetoric of "awareness" and "realising potential" is the theme of personal success in achieving today's valued goals: sex, esteem, power in relation to others, and so on. For example, an early Transcendental Meditation publication observed: "Meditate . . . and . . . not only unfold the consciousness of God, but begin to supplement and reinforce the material glories of life."

Second, in some movements, the dominant theme is one of *accommodation*—that is, reducing expectations to a realistic level. This theme is most clearly evident in est, which encourages participants to make the most of their present experience and live for present, rather than future, aims. est assures its adherents that "This is all there is," and they might as well enjoy it

rather than constantly compare their present condition unfavourably with some other, non-existent state of affairs. Even if members did achieve the new job, wife, home, image, they want, est assures them (with considerable, if mortifying realism) that they would only be happy with it for a couple days before they began to feel as dissatisfied with that, as with what they have now.

A third theme is that of *liberation* from social inhibitions: breaking free from the constraints of social roles to reach the person beneath; "getting in touch with" one's feelings, one's emotions; expressing the "authentic" self beneath the social facade; celebrating spontaneity, sensual pleasure and the indulgence of impulse. Most of the encounter movement falls under this theme, particularly developments like nude encounter.

This readily shades over into a fourth theme, that of achieving a sense of *intimacy*, of instant community. In a secure environment, or at least one sufficiently separated from the normal world for rebuff or failure not to count, individuals try not only to discover themselves, but also to make contact with others and open themselves to relationships which previously seemed threatening. One observer has remarked, for example, that "encounter-groups have become a respectable lonely hearts club." . . .

Having viewed some concrete examples of movements, and noted the diversity that can be included under the term, we are now ready to offer a formal definition.

DEFINITION OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

A social movement is a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part. As a collectivity a movement is a group with indefinite and shifting membership and with leadership whose position is determined more by the informal response of adherents than by formal procedures for legitimizing authority.

1. Calling a movement a *collectivity* means that it is something of an interrelated and coacting unity of persons, rather than a mere aggregate of persons acting separately but in parallel fashion. There are *quasi-movements* that share some, but not the most essential, characteristics of a social movement. In a mass migration or a gold rush, for example, there is a certain amount of social contagion and we-feeling, though in the final analysis the be-

havior remains individual. There may be considerable activity in the common interest, such as combined action to protect migrants from hostile natives or to promote favorable political measures. But the governing objectives and plans of action remain individual. Nevertheless, the implications for change in society are often considerable, and we can learn something about the grass-roots, mass support aspects of social movements from studies of such phenomena.

2. A movement is marked by *continuity* in several respects. First, the movement's objective must be one that requires sustained activity. A movement could hardly develop over so short-range an objective as lynching a kidnapper, though the determination to control kidnapping in general could give rise to a movement. Likewise, there must be some continuity in movement strategy. There must be some organizational continuity, with some stability of leadership and other roles. Finally, there must be continuity of group identity, so that the movement is seen as historically continuous, even when there is rapid turnover of adherents.

Continuity is a matter of degree and no precise line of demarcation can be established between movements and more transitory phenomena. Certainly an organized demonstration that lasted only a few hours or a day would not qualify. The *sit-in* described below, that lasted twenty days in 1981, was also too limited in duration and scope to be treated as a social movement. But as an episode in the history of a larger social movement, it exemplifies a social movement in miniature, with a small group of activists, backed on specific occasions by a larger pool of supporters, speaking for a still larger constituency, with a martyr as symbolic leader, well developed strategy and tactics, and plans for extending the campaign.

Hospital Ousts VA Protestors Without Strife

Patt Morrison and Eric Malnic

More than 40 veterans were peacefully evicted early Tuesday from the Wadsworth Veterans

Administration Hospital in West Los Angeles where they had been conducting a sit-in since May 20.

Most of the veterans, including 12 who have been fasting, broke up their encampment in front of the hospital without incident and left the grounds after an order to disperse was read to them at 5:45 a.m.

But seven sit-ins in the hospital lobby—one of them an Army nurse from Texas, another an ex-POW—refused to leave voluntarily and were carried out of the hospital by members of a force of 48 Veterans Administration police officers.

"There were no problems," VA Detective Larry Hicks said of the eviction. "Everything was handled in a peaceful manner."

The veterans are demanding independent investigations of VA care and studies of the effects of the chemical defoliant Agent Orange, which was used during the Vietnam War. They are also demanding a personal meeting with President Reagan.

The VA says it is arranging for two non-VA doctors to look into care at Wadsworth and nearby Brentwood VA hospital and has begun preparations for an investigation of the toxic effects of herbicides.

In response to another of the protesters' demands, the VA says independent doctors are looking into the case of former marine James Hopkins, who claimed to be suffering from the effects of Agent Orange. Two months before his questionable death last month, Hopkins drove a jeep through a plate glass door at the VA facility in Brentwood and fired gunshots into the ceiling. Results of an autopsy on Hopkins' body are incomplete.

After their eviction Tuesday the protesters marched off the hospital grounds behind an American flag and climbed into cars to go to the Center for Veterans Rights at St. John's Episcopal Church on West Adams Boulevard in Central Los Angeles.

Before they left, they cleaned up the encampment site outside the hospital and the sit-in area in the lobby.

At St. John's, the hunger strikers announced they would continue their fast on the church grounds while arrangements are made for a caravan to Washington later this summer to continue the demonstration at the White House gates.

About 100 demonstrators and their supporters attended a noon prayer service at which activist-comedian Dick Gregory compared the

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fasters' effects to the civil rights movements of the 1960s.

3. Because it promotes or resists social change, a movement is different from a group whose activities are entirely self-contained. A following, such as a fan club, unites adherents in admiration of a public figure without necessarily identifying the hero with any program for societal reform. Self-help and self-improvement groups are sometimes concerned exclusively with the needs of their members. Members of religious sects and cults can be concerned only for their own salvation.

In many cases, however, self-help themes are mixed with themes of societal betterment through personal transformation. This is usually the case with religious groups. By active proselyting, devotees enlarge the body of the personally transformed, until a critical mass is achieved for the transformation of society. When enough people have learned to live by the rule of love, for example, disputes between nations will be resolved without war. The groups described by Roy Wallis include such themes of societal reform through personal transformation in their official ideologies. They qualify as movements to the extent to which these themes do influence the conduct of the group.

The fact that a social movement works to promote or resist some change in society not only provides a criterion for distinguishing movements from nonmovements, but also supplies a basis for establishing movement boundaries. Besides sharing certain key objectives and identifying themselves with the movement, the people "in" the movement engage in some activity in support of the movement or its goals, and attempt to exercise some influence over the direction taken by the movement, either directly or indirectly by communicating through informal interpersonal networks linked to the movement. By this criterion the movement is distinguished from both the movement *constituency* and movement *sympathizers*, as well as from the *opposition* and *bystander publics* (Chapter 11).

The term *constituency* is borrowed from politics. An elected public official's constituency consists of all the people eligible to vote in the official's district, whether they voted for or against the official or failed to vote altogether. The important considerations are that the official claims to speak for the constituency

and chiefly depends upon support from the constituency. By analogy, a nationalistic movement claims to speak for the nation, a labor movement for all the workers in some set of occupations or industries, and a peace movement for all peace lovers. Furthermore, each movement is expected to recruit most of its adherents from its constituency. As we shall see later, the nature of the constituency and the relationships between movement and constituency affect the movement's credibility, ease and mode of recruiting, and chances for success. But the constituency includes people who are indifferent or opposed to the movement, or only passively sympathetic, and who therefore should not be included within the movement.

Similarly, a movement has *sympathizers* who do nothing to support the movement or the cause. Sympathizers may or may not belong to the constituency. But they are distinguished from movement adherents by their failure to act on their convictions.

Since being in a movement is a matter of attitude and action rather than formal induction, we speak of movement *adherents* rather than members. In most movements the supporting actions of most adherents are fairly minimal. They may pay dues to one or more movement organizations, write an occasional letter to a public official or newspaper, turn out for an infrequent demonstration, or argue the movement case with friends and associates. It is sometimes useful to distinguish *activists* from the bulk of the adherents by the level of effort and sacrifice they give to the cause.

4. In spite of the criteria of activity and identification, movement boundaries can seldom if ever be set with precision, because of the existence of movements within movements and overlapping movements. There is a comprehensive environmental movement that is mobilized on issues like presidential appointment of a Secretary of the Interior who was considered unfriendly to environmental causes. There are also specialized environmental movements primarily concerned with protecting wildlife, securing clean air for cities, promoting wilderness areas, cleaning up rivers for the sake of urban health and quality of life, and protecting remote natural rivers for recreational purposes. They draw support from partially overlapping constituencies, but many activists for urban smog control are indifferent to the protection of wilderness areas or preservation of

endangered species of animal and plant life. And there are strictly localized and focused movements, like the movement to preserve Georgia's Okefenokee Swamp, to prevent oil drilling in a specific community, or to establish a local mountain park. Adherents to each of these local movements include many people who have no interest in more general environmental concerns, but wish to enhance their own local environment. The problem of movements within movements cannot be disposed of by semantics, by arbitrarily limiting the concept of social movement to collectivities of a certain scope. Movement processes take place at every level. We must acknowledge that a common feature of social movements is that they overlap and interlock, and that movements crystallize at different levels of comprehensiveness. We must always try to be clear about the scope of any movement we choose to study, and pay close attention to its relations with both broader and narrower movements.

5. While we have defined a movement as a collectivity, we often find ourselves talking about organizations when we speak of movements. When we say that the environmental movement supported certain legislation, we find that representatives from the Sierra Club, the National Wildlife Federation, and other organizations were actually being quoted. When we hear of some accomplishment by the consumer movement, it often turns out to be an agreement negotiated by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen organization. In what sense can we speak of a social movement apart from the organizations? How can we speak of a collectivity when the organizations have formalized membership, leadership, decision-making procedures, and goals?

The relationships between movements and *movement organizations* are complex. A common pattern is illustrated by the following excerpts from a more comprehensive account of the movement against nuclear power.

A-Protestors: Single Issue, Many Groups —

Joan Sweeney

... The antinuclear movement is an uneasy amalgamation of peaceniks, environmentalists,

farmers and housewives, and rock stars like Jackson Browne and Bonnie Raitt who attract attention and raise money.

Issues raised by the antinuclear movement have been around and debated for some time: the safety of nuclear plants; the threat of world annihilation posed by nuclear weapons; low-level radiation hazards; the problem of storing growing amounts of nuclear waste, some of which will remain radioactive for many thousands of years; the worldwide proliferation of nuclear power plants the byproducts of which could be used to make nuclear weapons; the threat of nuclear terrorism or sabotage and the attendant security that could erode civil liberties.

But it took the accident last March [1979] at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania to catalyze the antinukes into a broader and more visible movement:

"We had around-the-clock calls coming in (after the accident) from people who had never asked questions before," said Betty Taylor, director of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service in Washington, an information clearinghouse and referral service for the movement. "It added a whole new constituency to what before was a smaller movement." . . .

But the accident failed to fuse the antinukes into a united national movement. It is, instead, a diffuse collection of groups, whose members sometimes disagree not only on the means but on the end. For some, the goal may be as narrow as stopping a specific nuclear plant from being built. For others, it is as broad as changing the political and economic structure of the nation.

"We are working for long-term radical change in this country," Susan Mesner of California's Abalone Alliance said. "Money spent on the research and development of nuclear weapons and the nuclear industry is essentially money not being put into other services. We're talking about totally rearranging priorities for the country."

Those seeking broader economic and political change deny they are using the antinuclear issue to disguise their real goal.

The Rev. Robert Moore of the Mobilization for Survival, a coalition of 150 groups around the country that lists as its goals banning nuclear power and weapons, stopping the arms race, and using the money instead to "fund human needs," said:

"I don't agree that the nuclear power issue is sort of a front for our real agenda. We're very up front about the fact that part of our agenda is to change the priorities of this country."

A sociologist who has examined the movement, Robert Cameron Mitchell with the Resources for the Future in Washington, said, "I don't see a small group of people who are manipulating it for their own ends."

The movement is a network of loose alliances, of fluid and changing coalitions that form and re-form to back various "actions." It is beset with the stresses of factionalism and the strains of petty jealousies and suspicions.

Democratization and decentralization are frequently heard words among antinukes and help explain, in part, why would-be national leaders of the movement, either self-anointed or media-appointed, are viewed with suspicion.

"There's a great deal of resentment when Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden gather media attention and get looked at as spokespeople," one West Coast activist said. "They get asked all the questions when most of the work is being done by people who aren't known at all."

"There's a kind of paranoia about people taking leadership," Betsy Taylor of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service said. "Anybody claiming leadership runs into problems in this movement because there just isn't anybody who is in a position of leading it."

"A tremendous amount of distrust of leaders has developed." Pollack, the Critical Mass director, agreed. "People don't want the movement to be distorted, misconstrued by people who have a different agenda. They don't want to be exploited for other people's aims."

Early nuclear opposition concentrated on weapons. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, SANE and other peace groups fought for an end to atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons.

At that time, peaceful uses of nuclear energy were mostly perceived as harmless, beneficial and, in the words of one overly optimistic energy official, "too cheap to matter." Civilian nuclear power, Cornell University's Dorothy Nelkin said, was seen as a sort of justification for weapons development.

But with the dawning of the environmental era in the late 1960s and early 1970s, questions were raised about the environmental effects of nuclear power plants. Environmental groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Friends of the Earth began battling nuclear power plants through lobbying and litigation.

Scientists came out of their laboratories to make public their doubts about the long term effects of low-level radiation and of plant safety. In 1971, the Union of Concerned Scientists ques-

tioned the safety of emergency core cooling systems to protect reactors from meltdown.

These disagreements between scientists made the public more aware that uncertainties cloud nuclear power.

And quietly, as the number of nuclear power plants, proposed or constructed, proliferated so did the number of local groups springing up to fight them.

It is uncertain just how many of these groups there are now. Betsy Taylor of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service estimates 1,000. Peter Carr, a California State University, Long Beach professor, who is compiling an oral history of the movement said he has found more than 400 in the western United States.

"Every major nuclear facility in the U.S. has a consensus organization of some kind around it working to stop it," Carr said.

In the beginning, many groups pursued their goal through traditional legal means, an expensive process.

"We were always running flea markets, bake sales, anything to raise money," Diann Garand of Seabrook, N.H. recalled of the early years in the fight, conducted in the courts against the plant there.

In 1974, Nader took up the issue. He called a citizen's conference and founded Critical Mass. . . .

In 1976, some New Hampshire residents had been battling the Seabrook plant for seven years through legal channels, and on March 2 of that year, a Seabrook town meeting voted 768 to 632 against the plant.

But on July 7, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted a construction permit.

"People were frustrated at this point," Diann Garand recalls. "The town had voted against it. They felt, 'We've got to show people that we don't want this thing.'"

Six days after the commission action, the Clamshell Alliance was formed to unite New England anti-nuclear groups to fight Seabrook with "direct action." That summer 18 persons were arrested in the first attempt to "occupy" the Seabrook site.

By spring, 1977, more than 2,000 people moved onto the site and 1,414 of them were arrested, causing the state, which had to house, feed, and guard many of them when they refused to post bond, considerable financial discomfort.

The demonstrations did not stop construction at Seabrook, a la Wyl, but they did get massive media attention.

Dozens of alliances with Clamshell, which now has 90 member groups as their prototype sprang up across the U.S. Alliances with names like Catfish (Alabama), Oystershell (Louisiana), Prairie (Illinois), Northern Sun (Minnesota), Sunflower (Kansas), Lone Star (Texas), Cactus (Colorado), New Mexico, Nevada), Crabshell (Washington), Headwaters (Montana), Shad (New York), Padlewheel (Kentucky), Abalone (California).

There are now, according to Donald Ross of the New York research group, dozens of these alliances, which he calls, "very decentralized, very localized, with very, very different capabilities in terms of resources, sophistication and size. They're the shock troops of the movement."

They also involved former antiwar people and young leftists in the issue.

These grass-roots groups, which espouse democracy, more citizen voice in decision making, and decentralization, practice what they preach. . . .

In California, the Abalone Alliance was formed in June, 1977, with the Clamshell as its model. At its founding conference about seven or eight antinuclear power groups were represented. Now more than 40 are part of Abalone.

A major emphasis of California groups has been the Diablo Canyon plant, near San Luis Obispo, and it is closely watched by other groups across the country. . . .

"Diablo Canyon is the Seabrook of the West," said Harvey Wasserman, a free-lance journalist and antinuclear activist on the East Coast. . . .

The Southern California Alliance for Survival, formed in 1977, is "one of the few in the country" that "pretty much works on both nuclear power and weapons issues," according to David Lumian, one of its founders.

Reflecting its dual concerns, it is affiliated both with the Abalone alliance and the Mobilization for Survival and took part of its name from each group.

The Alliance for Survival also is somewhat different from other grass-roots alliances in that it has chapters—40 community and 40 college—according to Lumian.

There is also a Northern California Alliance for Survival, which formerly was known as the Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. It is focused more toward the weapons issue while Abalone is oriented more toward power, Lumian said.

It is only recently that the two sides of the nuclear opposition, weapons and power, have

begun to come together. Antipower groups have been reluctant to embrace nuclear weapons as an issue, and vice versa. . . .

The Mobilization for Survival or Mobe, which was formed in the spring of 1977 by representatives of peace organizations, some antinuclear power and other citizen groups, tried to tie the weapons and power branches together.

It also attempted to pull the diffused movement into a national coalition.

"One of the reasons Mobe exists is that a bunch of local organizations working apart from each other doesn't necessarily have national impact," said Mobe's Moore. "I think we have to have a conscious national strategy aimed at impacting national policy."

But in the view of many others in the movement, Mobe, which is looked upon as more peace-oriented, has had only limited success. . . .

So far the only time the movement seems to have truly coalesced was for the May 6 rally in Washington when the Three Mile accident was the coagulant, and even then there were tensions between the consensus groups and the more traditionally structured organizations.

The accident had come on the heels of the movie, "The China Syndrome." Although the movie was melodramatic with a strongly anti-nuclear message, it appeared at times that its writers had also written the scenario for Three Mile Island.

"All the parallels were there," said Anthony Z. Roisman, a leading antinuclear attorney for 10 years. "Three Mile Island was a public relations meltdown (for the nuclear industry). The combination of the accident, the movie, and 25 years of the nuclear industry saying it can't happen, won't happen here—it blew up in their face. Just the convergence of all that is what makes me think God is basically antinuclear."

After the accident, antinuclear groups found their phones ringing off the hook.

"We heard from people we never heard from before," Pollock said. "We'd never gotten the kind of imploring calls—people saying, 'What should I do.' There was a tremendous feeling of betrayal, a gut-wrenching response. But the problem was where do you focus all this anger?"

The answer was the Washington rally that drew 70,000 (official estimate) or 120,000 (spectator's estimate).

Although the Sept. 23 rally in New York sponsored by the Musicians United for Safe Energy (MUSE) drew 200,000, it was more of a local event

and some of the urgency and anger that Three Mile Island had generated seemed to have dissipated according to some observers.

MUSE has been raising money for the movement with a series of rock concerts. A record and a movie are in the works to further swell the coffers. The money will be distributed by the MUSE Foundation. Its president, Sam Lovejoy, who has turned to other ways than toppling towers to get his antinuclear message across, said the foundation has mailed out 2,000 unsolicited applications to antinuclear and energy groups.

Some see MUSE, with the fund-raising capability of the rock stars within its fold, as a potential power force in the movement, which has been mostly financed by contributions and grants from a few foundations.

Not surprisingly, that makes others, in the diverse movement, particularly on the West Coast, uncomfortable. . . .

One of the most recent entrants on the antinuclear scene is Hollywood United for Safe Energy (HOUSE), which has borrowed more than just a major portion of its name from MUSE. It plans to enlist Hollywood personalities to reach people and to raise funds. The Friends of the Earth will act as consultants to HOUSE. . . .

Descriptions like the foregoing could be endlessly repeated for most powerful social movements today. Often an umbrella term, like the Moral Majority that claimed much of the credit for Ronald Reagan's defeat of Jimmy Carter for President of the United States in 1980, is applied to many organizations whose members would disagree over use of the term. Clearly, as Robert Stallings has proposed, the study of collaboration versus opposition among the organizations within a broad movement is one of the most important topics for investigation.³

In other instances a movement seems to be the creature of a single organization. This is often the case with religious movements, specific self-help movements, and charismatic political movements like the Nazi party in Germany in the 1930s and 1940s.

The account of antinuclear organizations stresses the importance of grass roots activity and the inability of any one organization or stable coalition of organizations to control the movement. But many movement organizations provide little opportunity for adherents

to participate in decision making and require little of them besides making periodic financial contributions. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald speak of the *professionalization* of social movements as an increasingly prevalent pattern in American society.⁴ As a prime example they cite Common Cause, a liberal organization founded in 1970 to lobby for a wide range of causes. Its policies are governed by a core group of former government officials and supported through mass mailings for donations from people who are usually not even kept well-informed of the organization's activities.

Why, then, are not the theories of intra-organizational process and inter-organizational process sufficient to explain social movements? Why should social movements be considered a form of collective behavior?

First, we believe that McCarthy and Zald have stretched the term movement organizations too far in applying it to interest group organizations that simply solicit contributions through mass mailings in much the way that organized charities do and require nothing more of their adherents. (However, for further discussion of movement professionalization, see Chapter 19).

Second, many adherents and even activists in popular movements resist formal membership in any movement organization. Many will argue the movement's case among friends and join in demonstrations while resisting payment of dues to an organization. Many are "free spirits" who resist being subject to control by an organization, or being committed to one organization among many, or even getting on a mailing list. Still others support organizational goals selectively, or view organizational leaders and activists as fanatics while supporting a more moderate course of action themselves. These non-member adherents nevertheless affect the course of the movement substantially. Even in case of a single-organization religious movement, E. Burke Rochford found that new recruits to Hare Krishna were often directed there by fringe adherents who were themselves unwilling to make the level of commitment entailed by formal membership.⁵

Third, while some movement organizations have all the paraphernalia of formalized associations, many if not most have only embryonic organizational structures. Leadership is typically self-appointed on the basis of willingness and determination, with unformalized

cooperation from movement adherents as the continuing unofficial referendum. Even though legal papers of incorporation are usually necessary, movement organizations generally work with mailing lists rather than membership lists. In an interview, Candy Lightner, who founded Mothers Against Drunk Drivers (MADD) in Sacramento, California, in 1980, answered questions about membership as follows:

"... They all, or most of them, are mothers who have lost children. Some are women who have lost husbands."

Do men belong?

"Absolutely. We have people who don't have children; we have single people; we have Kiwanis organizations."

How many members do you have in the Sacramento area?

"I have no idea. It's in the thousands now."

It's basically people who can energize, like in a letter-writing campaign?

"Right. They are all on our mailing list."

Willing to be recognized as members?

"Absolutely. . . ."⁶

The discussion of movement organizations brings us finally to the question of where the study of social movements fits into the study of collective behavior. Collective behavior includes phenomena that fall between group and organizational behavior organized on the basis of rules and tradition or intimate personal relations, on the one hand, and disparate individual behavior on the other. In contrast to momentary panics and mass behavior, which are relatively individuated, social movements fall near the boundary that separates collective behavior from strictly organized and institutionalized behavior. Movements that persist over time increasingly lose the distinctive features of collective behavior. Thus, although they began as social movements, established labor organizations, religious denominations, political parties, and similar institutionalized enterprises are no longer instances of collective behavior. But for true social movements, principles from collective behavior and organizational behavior must be conjoined to provide adequate understanding.

APPROACHES TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Social movements have been studied in a variety of ways and there is much to be learned

from each perspective. Political scientists and political sociologists, for example, look selectively at social movements because of the part some of them play in the political process. Students of religion look equally selectively at religious movements. Unfortunately for such approaches, few movements respect the sharp separation between political, religious, and other spheres of life. And without examining different kinds of movements the investigator has no way to separate the distinctively political or religious processes from processes applicable to social movements of all kinds.

Similarly, students of social change and conflict pay selective attention to movements that terminate in revolution, movements that represent major conflict constituencies such as economic classes, and conflict strategies and relations among movements. Still other students seek to understand conditions in society that they view as pathological, and consequently develop theories that are specific to collective violence, extremism, ultra-right wing or ultra-left wing tendencies, collective flights from reality and psychopathology, and collective resistance to "progress" and individual freedom. Here the dangers are especially great: that the investigator will look for ulterior and irrational motives to explain movement activities and objectives that are not taken at face value because the investigator cannot empathize with them; and that features like the presence of a noisy extremist fringe such as characterize almost every kind of movement will be mistakenly viewed as distinctive to the type of movement under study.

In contrast, we are concerned with movements as interesting and significant phenomena in their own right. Hence we try to look at movements comparatively, asking the same questions about political, cultural, and religious movements, and seeking answers that apply to movements of different kinds. When we find that a generalization about recruitment to movements, for example, does not apply equally to all kinds of movements, we try to see whether a more sociologically meaningful way of classifying movements distinguishes between instances in which the generalization applies and does not apply.

Two questions are most frequently asked by students of social movements. (1) Under what circumstances will movements occur? (2) Under what circumstances will movements succeed or fail? But satisfactory answers to these

questions may depend upon first answering a range of questions following the patterns: (3) Under what circumstances will a movement take one course rather than another; or exhibit one set of characteristics rather than another? The latter question can be asked about the type of ideology or program espoused in the movement, the strategies in achieving and exercising power, the patterns of internal organization and relations with outside groups, the mechanisms for commitment and control of adherents, and changes in all of these.

We shall outline three broad types of approach to the study of movements as phenomena of interest in their own right, namely grass roots, resource mobilization, and collective behavior.

Grass-Roots Approaches According to common sense—at least in societies where a democratic world view is prevalent—social movements result from grass-roots collaboration. Some condition that is contrary to the interests or values of a significant constituency comes into existence, is intensified, or spreads so as to affect more people than before. More and more people become more and more frustrated, leading to mushrooming public expressions of discontent. When discontent exceeds some identifiable threshold, or some especially aggravating event makes people dramatically aware of conditions, like-minded people begin urgent discussion of their grievances. The discussion serves on the one hand to produce agreement on a plan of action, and on the other hand to forge bonds that enable the discontented to work together as a dynamic unit. The emerging movement's dedicated core adherents engage in vigorous proselytizing until the movement's power and influence are great enough to effect whatever change is being sought.

The grass-roots image takes two rather different forms: An early version accepted the explicit movement goals at face value. The dynamic journalist Jacob Riis dramatically portrayed *How the Other Half Lives* in 1890, stirring human compassion and indignation to a level sufficient to stimulate movements for reform of urban neighborhoods.⁷ The Louisiana politician Huey Long attracted a nationwide following in the 1920s among people who believed that his "Share our wealth" program could indeed correct economic injustice and end the Depression. We call this the *purposive*

grass roots model, since it emphasizes grass-roots activity in support of a clearly defined goal.

As concepts from popularized—or vulgarized—versions of psychiatric thinking became increasingly familiar, the purposive grass roots model was often replaced by a *clinical grass roots* model, stressing hidden irrational motivations for social movements. Movements were interpreted as vehicles for dealing with personal frustrations while disguising pathological motives as lofty ideals. Movements in support of underdog groups were explained as assuaging the guilt feelings of the unjustly privileged. Movements against minority groups or privileged classes were said to manifest displaced aggression, provoked by economic, status, or interpersonal frustration. Today this kind of thinking is so widely diffused in popular culture that it has become standard journalism and is frequently employed uncritically by social and behavior scientists. Both journalists and scholars often apply the purposive model to movements they approve of and the clinical model to movements they disparage.

The purposive grass-roots model is sometimes a good starting point for analysis of a social movement because of its parsimony. But it is seldom adequate to explain development of a movement and is usually misleading when used alone. We shall stress four observations that contradict the model, and that must be accommodated in any adequate model for social movement analysis. (1) It is seldom the most deprived groups who form or support movements; (2) goals of a movement do not necessarily correspond closely with the source of discontent; (3) the emotion arising from deprivation is seldom as important as effective organization in sustaining a movement; and (4) the rise and decline of a movement often depends more upon the coalitions formed with groups having established power at their disposal than upon the rise and decline of grass-roots discontent. Each of these caveats merits discussion.

Extreme Deprivation and Movement Support. Deprivation often helps to supply the intense motivation necessary for overcoming ordinary obstacles to movement membership. However, frustration by itself is never a guarantee of receptivity to movements. Long-continued frustration characteristically leads to hopelessness and preoccupation with imme-

diate and momentary survival problems which mitigate against participation in the promotion of any reform. Frustration from recent losses or the experience of improving conditions is more likely than long-continued frustration to make individuals receptive.

The failure of those in greatest need to support movements to better their condition has exasperated many a social reformer. The Social Credit party in Quebec, in 1962, was a new movement whose greatest appeal was among persons who identified themselves as working class. Yet, as Maurice Pinard shows, support was greater among persons of moderate income than among persons in the lowest income category, unless there was some unemployment in the family.⁸ Among moderate and higher income respondents, those who said they worried about how they could get along financially in the next year voted for Social Credit more often than did persons who worried "almost none." But among the lowest income respondents, worry was negatively related to support for Social Credit.

Recent investigations have turned from the objective deprivations of poverty and discrimination to the subjective states of deprivation reflected in attitudes such as anomia and alienation. It does seem unlikely that persons who feel thoroughly at harmony with the world about them will be avid supporters of movements to change that world. But anomia, the attitude of despair and the sense of living in a purposeless and normless world, is more likely to immobilize individuals and undermine the trust essential to collaboration in a movement than it is to promote activism. Similarly, the sense of powerlessness that is one form of alienation discourages commitment to a goal of reforming or transforming society.⁹ There are circumstances under which the alienated and the anomic may join in support of an already powerful movement and be the mainstay of cultish groups. But they are unlikely to be in the forefront of activism or to provide a sufficiently dependable base upon which to build a movement.

Goals and the Source of Discontent. Theories that attribute the growth of social movements to widespread anomie and alienation and such other attitudes as authoritarianism also relate to the second caveat concerning grass-roots approaches: goals of a movement do not necessarily correspond closely with the source of

discontent. Even evidence that adherents to a movement exhibit all or some of these attitudes is often deceptive. Every movement develops an ideology—a view of society, of relevant events, and of the movement and its members—that becomes for loyal adherents the authentic account of what the movement is all about (see Chapter 14). Ideology tells the adherents what attitudes they are supposed to have. American movements centering about civil rights, student protest, and organized opposition to American military involvements in southeast Asia, as well as certain right-wing movements protesting entrenched liberal philosophies, claimed to be seeking the return of power to large population segments who had been deprived of a voice in national affairs. From both sides the current unhappy state of affairs was explained on the basis of usurpation and centralization of power. Adherents who paid attention to movement ideology learned that the vague discontent and uneasiness they felt was the sense of powerlessness. For the present we must therefore treat skeptically any theory of predisposing attitudes when those attitudes correspond closely to the approved motivations of members according to a well-advertised movement ideology.¹⁰

As we observed in the earlier discussion of rumor, collective behavior is not only collective action; it is also collaboration in creating an accepted version of reality. Social movements not only respond to the attitudes and motivations of their members; they also create new motivations and attitudes attuned to conceptions of the world that they help to create. This is a theme that will receive extended attention in a discussion of the sense of injustice in social movements and throughout the treatment of movements.

Emotion and Movement Continuity. The third caveat applies to the explanations of social movements based on the welling up of emotion and the surging of indignation and anger into a vigorous outflow of action. "If the people become angry enough," goes the observation, "they will do something!" Although there is an important partial truth in this assertion, it applies better to ephemeral crowd behavior than to social movements. Aroused emotion is unlikely to supply the staying power for a movement and often interferes with the development of effective organization, goals, and strategy. Emotional arousal demands

immediate and dramatic actions rather than considered and effective actions. Emotional arousal also interferes with the accommodations that must be made among diverse interests and points of view if many people are to work together as a social movement. Such arousal is probably more conducive to abortive actions of a violent nature than to sustained movements. These abortive actions may play a part in the development of a movement when there are more stably based groups that can make use of disorder but do not themselves provide an adequate foundation.

Employing data secured through interviews with a nationwide sample of 913 blacks in late 1964, Gary Marx was able to examine the relationship between antiwhite attitudes and activism. If emotional arousal were the simple key to support for a social movement, we could expect to find that blacks with the most intensely antiwhite attitudes were also the most active in civil-rights causes. But blacks who belonged to civil-rights organizations less often exhibited strongly antiwhite attitudes than did those who did not belong. And among 184 blacks who belonged to these organizations, those whose style of response to the civil-rights struggle was militant were less likely to report antiwhite attitudes than were blacks whose response was conservative. Noting the more advantaged backgrounds of the activists, Marx suggests that "for many militants their relative tolerance for whites is part of a generally tolerant world view related to their greater sophistication and greater exposure to official values."¹¹ The activists also probably combined more hope with their frustration to sustain them in the day-to-day effort toward long-range betterment of the black's position.

If Marx's findings are generally valid, the popular supposition that black activists felt the greatest hatred for whites probably stems from two errors of perception. First, the intense hatred on the part of unaffiliated ghettodwellers went unrecognized by whites except when it was expressed in the sporadic violence of urban riots. Second, black movements of that period employed a rhetoric of white hatred as part of their strategy for prodding whites into action and for recruiting black support, a rhetoric that did not necessarily indicate more intense feelings than were experienced by less active blacks.

External Coalitions and Power. The fourth caveat, that support of the movement by groups already possessing great power may have a more important effect than the rise and decline of grass-roots support, may be illustrated by referring to McCarthyism, which followed World War II. While still a junior senator, Joseph McCarthy rocketed to national prominence as leader of the fight against alleged communists in government, using hearings of his senate subcommittee to subject the accused to public degradation. Most of his successes came without the kind of evidence that would have been needed to secure conviction in a court of law. The movement reached a peak during 1951 and 1952, with the result that thousands of liberals throughout the United States were discredited and blacklisted in government and business. Then quite suddenly McCarthy lost public favor in 1953, and the movement subsided to a small radical-right group.

There have been many thoughtful efforts to explain why the movement peaked and declined when it did. Most of these efforts have concentrated on the sources and nature of discontent among large population segments. Postwar economic readjustments, inflation that depressed the position of persons on fixed incomes, the effect of the war in weakening traditional lines of racial separation and subordination, and the changing avenues for upward mobility were among conditions that altered the relative standing of groups in society, creating discontent among those who lost out in these readjustments. These analyses of discontent are important, but they do not explain the sudden decline of the movement. Furthermore, most of the conditions were in the making well before the movement blossomed. Hence it is important to supplement the grass-roots analysis with a different kind of explanation. As a freshman senator, Joseph McCarthy could not have held the subcommittee chairmanship nor received massive publicity for the hearings without the support of powerful persons and groups. McCarthyism arose near the end of a twenty-year period during which the Republican party had been repeatedly frustrated in efforts to unseat the Democratic party nationally. McCarthy injected a new element into the political situation by shaking public confidence in the patriotism of the Democratic establishment. Although responsible Party leaders could not make the kind of unsubstantiated charges and attacks on individuals that Sen-

ator McCarthy engaged in, they stood to profit greatly from his efforts. But in 1953 the Republicans came to power, and McCarthy promptly turned his guns on the new administration. It took only a few months for the Republican administration to strip him of the privileges and resources that had enabled him to attract and hold a mass following. In short, the movement prospered when it served the purposes of the Republican party and quickly declined when it no longer did so.¹²

An extreme position in opposition to grass-roots explanation asserts that there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group. Hence one looks to power struggles among elites rather than to grass-roots discontents to explain the rise and fall of movements.

A moderate position is that significant grass-roots support in some constituency is necessary but not sufficient to produce a social movement or to make it effective. A corrected purposive grass-roots model is incomplete in failing to deal with two major problems. One is the problem of achieving and sustaining collaboration among adherents and movement organizations. In the terms used earlier to describe approaches to crowd behavior, the grass-roots model is a *convergence* approach, assuming that collaboration will take place automatically if enough people who share an intense enough concern are brought together. The other is the problem of exercising power over crucial decision makers in order to implement described changes.

2 Resource Mobilization Approaches Resource mobilization approaches begin by asking when social movements arise and when they are successful. They take seriously the obvious answer to the second question: when movements have control of abundant resources and use them wisely. A movement with enough money to buy television time and hire professional lobbyists has great advantages over one that lacks money. But using the money indiscreetly to bribe officials may discredit the movement. Or following an inappropriate strategy may squander resources.

How can a movement acquire and keep control of substantial resources? Not merely by having a band of enthusiastic supporters. Or-

ganization is required to gather, hold, and mobilize resources according to some planned strategy. A simple and informal association might suffice in a tribal society where all relationships were face-to-face. But the scope of modern societies, the web of legal and tax problems encompassing any association, and the entrenched power of *establishments* require formalized and sophisticated organizations. Hence the key to movement success or failure lies much more in the quality of movement organization than in the devotion of adherents, according to this approach. Our attention is shifted away from the grass roots, away from the mass of adherents, and toward the resources controlled and the organization through which the resources are mobilized. Research concentrates on the core group in each movement organization, consisting of sophisticated strategists who guide the movement according to a rational assessment of alternative strategies and tactics in relation to established movement goals. Rather than seeing social movements as expressions of human involvement in a cause, resource mobilization theorists see them as expressions of the impersonal rationality of highly organized bodies with sufficient resources to challenge established centers of power.

The same logic is then applied to the rise of social movements that we have just applied to their success and failure. According to a version of resource mobilization theory put forward by John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, the extent of movement activity in any society is directly related to the resource level in the society. In time of scarcity all resources are required for survival and institutional uses and there will be little if any movement activity. In time of abundance the surplus of resources will be used to launch and promote social movements. The rise and decline of movement activity will thus reflect, not so much the level of grievance as the availability of surplus resources.¹³

A more widely accepted application of resource mobilization logic stresses the difficulty that any grass-roots group would have in assembling resources and building an organization. If we had a record of small spontaneous protests it would undoubtedly show us that most are ephemeral. We might also learn that in the absence of prior organization, discontent seldom reaches the stage of protest. Rather than finding that a corps of devotees build their

own organization and assemble needed resources, we would find that in most instances an established organization makes the resources available to start a movement.

Leading exponents of resource mobilization theory are in extensive agreement that the time and place of social movement are affected very little by the rise and fall of objective deprivation, the subjective sense of grievance, the level of relative deprivation, or the formulation and circulation of relevant beliefs and ideas. According to Oberschall:

The central problem in creating an enduring movement is not the development of novel beliefs and opposition ideas, but the cementing together of an organizational network, which is always easier when some group networks already exist. Ideas and beliefs that have a revolutionary potential are usually present and are available for use by a protest leadership. Sentiments of opposition, of being wronged, are also frequently present in the lower orders and can be easily linked with the more elaborate ideologies and world views.¹⁴

McCarthy and Zald quote an earlier edition of this book, saying,

We are willing to assume (Turner and Killian [1972] call the assumption extreme) . . . that there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group. For some purposes we go even further: grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations.¹⁵

A somewhat different version of resource mobilization theory has been developed by Charles Tilly from a partially Marxian perspective.¹⁶ Tilly explains *collective action*, "people's acting together in pursuit of common interests," as resulting from "changing combinations of interests, organization, mobilization, and opportunity." Tilly finds interests rooted in class membership and serving as the basis for organization. Organization makes possible the mobilization of resources. Mobilization for action encounters either repression or facilitation by the authorities, based chiefly on the interests that are being served, and a wider range of opportunity or threat. Taking into account the power of the contending groups, the resulting level of mobilization

largely determines the extent and effectiveness of collective action. This simple starting model is elaborated into a complex set of hypotheses about the development of class-based movements. In addition to the Marxian assumptions about the class-rootedness of interests, Tilly's theory is distinguished by giving less credence to the level of resources in society as explaining the abundance and strength of social movements, taking more account of personal commitment to the movement as a factor in mobilization, and qualifying the more extreme assumptions of rationality by noting that movements draw from currently popular *repertoires of contention* in selecting their tactics rather than rationally surveying all possible tactics.

The logic of resource mobilization is used by most of its advocates as a sensitizing perspective rather than a body of precise theory. Used in this way, resource mobilization theory has highlighted neglected features of social movements and complemented the one-sidedness of grass-roots assumptions. But leading advocates offer resource mobilization as a theory from which precise and testable propositions about a wide range of movement phenomena can be generated. At present the ambitious formulations of Tilly, Oberschall, and Zald and McCarthy outstrip available evidence. The flurry of research they have stimulated will no doubt begin to remedy this discrepancy soon. Pending the accumulation of empirical evidence, we shall outline a few of the questions frequently raised concerning resource mobilization as a theory of social movements.

1. The claims for resource mobilization theory assume that *resource* and *mobilization* are precise and quantifiable concepts. But there is disagreement over what should be included under the term resource, and few efforts have been made to set reasonable boundaries. Such varied phenomena as money, access to the mass media, support from powerful organizations and decision makers, support by movement adherents, and credible claims to use emotionally charged symbols and slogans have been called resources. The more broadly the term is used, the less clearly resource mobilization theory is distinguished from traditional collective behavior approaches and the less quantifiable the data employed. Fireman and Gamson are among those who have argued that the usefulness of the approach is blunted when

concepts like resource are broadened in this way.¹⁷

2. The rationality assumptions seem unreasonable. Over twenty years ago the economist Herbert Simon noted how seldom the conduct of business corporations conforms to the standard optimizing models of rationality favored by other economists. He proposed models of weak or *bounded rationality* as more suitable.¹⁸ We do not say the movements are irrational—only that the impossibility of anticipating with any precision the probable outcomes of alternative courses of action makes such models inapplicable, and that imperfect control over adherents' actions limits the effectiveness with which centralized rational decision making can determine the course of a movement.

3. Resource mobilization theory disregards the reciprocity of relationships between core activists and the mass of adherents, which is often important in shaping a movement's course. Critics of the view of adherents as passively "mobilized" can find abundant evidence of initiative, criticism, and uncoordinated direct action from even peripheral adherents.

4. Values, goals, grievances, and conceptions of reality are taken for granted in resource mobilization theory, rather than treated as data to be explained.

5. Resource mobilization theory focuses on the passage of legislation, changed patterns of enforcement, and transfers of political power as the significant effects of social movements. Often, though, legislation remains unenforced and legislated programs underfunded, heightened enforcement lapses after the immediate pressure declines, and even transfers of power do little to bring about promised benefits. Furthermore, the great social movements like the women's movement, the environmental movement, civil rights movements, and ethnic nationalisms are as much involved in altering public conceptions and attitudes as they are in achieving legislative changes. The most profound effects of great movements are the personal transformations that take place among their adherents and sympathizers. These effects are slighted by resource mobilization theory, as is the admixture of personal transformation with societal manipulation in major movements. For this reason, the more extreme versions of resource mobilization theory may be more suitable for explaining the routine power adjustments among established inter-

est groups that are a continuous feature of life in a dynamic society than they are for explaining social movements.

Collective Behavior Approaches Grass-roots and resource mobilization approaches are polar points of view, the one stressing spontaneous behavior of individuals and neglecting organization, and the other neglecting adherents in its concentration on organization and resources. From its origins in the work of Robert Park, early in this century, the collective behavior tradition has taken a more balanced view, though often relegating the study of formal movement organizations to others.¹⁹ We list a few of the underlying assumptions applied to the study of social movements from the wider field of collective behavior.

1. Shared grievance and proposals for ameliorating intolerable conditions provide the unifying and directing focus for a movement. Grievance is typically manifested in a state of unrest which is the incubus for the movement, but which is clarified, intensified, and disseminated by the movement. Understanding the grievance and the state of unrest through the eyes of movement adherents and potential adherents is essential in the study of a social movement. In this respect collective behaviorists are closer to the purposive grass-roots approach than to resource mobilization, with the latter's deemphasis of grievance and social unrest, or to the clinical grass-roots approach.

2. Crucial in movement development is the effort to achieve a collective definition of the intolerable situation. Collective behavior of all kinds is in large part a collective effort to formulate and implant a consensus about the nature and meaning of situations. In this respect our view is different from both grass-roots and resource-mobilization theorists, for whom the nature of the situation is objectively given. Our earlier treatments of rumor, keynoting, symbolization, definitions of issues in the public, and related processes will find counterparts in the analysis of social movements.

3. A widespread sense of grievance does not automatically lead to collaboration, and without collaboration there is no social movement. Herbert Blumer, in one of the first statements about social movements in the collective behavior tradition, sharply distinguished between a state of widespread individual unrest and social unrest, which latter is both shared and intercommunicated.²⁰ Jackson and as-

sociates early pointed out the difficulty of organizing a movement based on a constituency of residential property owners because the established channels of communication link suburbs to the central city but not directly to other suburbs.²¹ Sustained collaboration, often on a nationwide basis, requires organization that is not needed for crowd behavior. In this emphasis the collective behavior approach is closer to resource mobilization than to grass roots analyses, in which collaboration is assumed to take place automatically when the level of concern is high enough.

4. As we did with crowd behavior, we must reject the assumption that a social movement is composed of people who are homogeneous in their attitudes and values. Adherents and even the leaders and activists bring divergent conceptions of the situation, the grievance, and the movement goals. Some adherents are personally dedicated to the movement cause, while others are attracted and held more by a sense of power or daring or simple sociability in movement participation. The coexistence of significant bodies of adherents and activists with such diverse motivations contributes to the direction taken by the movement. A movement tactic may be adopted or rejected because of its effect on sociability in the movement. The ascendance of power-driven adherents to leadership often causes a distortion of movement goals. In contrast to this dynamic heterogeneity assumption, grass-roots approaches assume homogeneity and resource mobilization theorists see adherents principally as neutral and impersonal resources to be mobilized as a military commander mobilizes troops.

5. Collective behaviorists have generally been skeptical of describing the course of a movement or the actions of individual adherents in either rational or irrational terms. The problems of applying concepts of rationality have already been discussed in Chapter 1 and this chapter. Collective behaviorists who do attempt to characterize particular movement actions as rational or irrational start from an assumption that irrational behavior is no more prevalent in social movements than in institutionalized settings. The behavior of bureaucrats, shoppers, students, faculty, and university administrators is more predictable but not more rational than the behavior of decision-makers and adherents in social movements.

6. Like other forms of collective behavior, social movements are continuously in process. Goals, ideologies, strategies, tactics, relations with authority and with other movements, movement structure, systems of adherent control, adherent gratifications, and even constituencies are all subject to change throughout the life of a movement. Because movements are not yet institutionalized and because a movement cannot be fully contained within any organization or stable alliance of organizations, movements are disproportionately subject to rapid change. Here we differ from resource mobilization theorists who typically take goals and organization as stable points for departure. Grass-roots approaches generally employ a simple and direct linkage between the initiating discontent and goals.

7. Robert Park linked the study of collective behavior and social control so closely that it was often difficult to separate them in analysis. Following that tradition we have emphasized the emergent normative component in all forms of collective behavior. In social movements the emergent normative element is the collective redefinition of a condition once viewed as a misfortune into a state of *injustice*.²² Human life is beset with problems, and many of these problems affect some class or categories of people more than others. But most of these problems—even those that are severe and shared—do not give rise to social movements. Social movements are inextricably linked with the moralistic view that what might have been accepted as a misfortune is now intolerable, that something about the system that generates it is illegitimate, that an injustice must be rectified. This normative definition transforms what might otherwise be simple interest-group politics into a crusade—and every social movement is a moral crusade. The question of how this redefinition occurs is generally overlooked in grass-roots approaches, and thought to be unimportant by resource mobilization theorists who make no such distinction between social movements and interest-group politics.

8. Finally, the collective behavior approach is less preoccupied with identifying conditions predictive of movement success and failure and more concerned with understanding the various transformations that take place in the movement career. It would be easy to judge a movement successful according to whether it achieves a tangible goal such as passage of

legislation, recall of a corrupt official, or establishment of a new church. But if the new church quickly falls into the patterns earlier found intolerable in the parent church, is that success? If legislation is enacted but not enforced or the program underfunded, or if the program does not have the intended effects, is the movement successful? When the women's movement failed to achieve ratification of the equal rights amendment to the United States Constitution in 1982, how great a failure was this in relation to the many less tangible changes brought about in the thinking of men and women about their proper relationships? If the *New Left* had a dismal record of legislative successes and found university structures impervious to change, how are we to evaluate these failures against the widespread changes in public tolerance for divergent life styles that were certainly helped along by the movement? To collective behaviorists an interest in movement processes takes the place of disproportionate emphasis on success and failure. How did the movement for equal educational opportunity come to adopt busing as its key goal? Why have consciousness raising and assertiveness training been generally accorded lower standing in the women's movement than legislative activity? How and when does a once-revolutionary movement alter its goals and strategies so as to work within the established structure? How are adherents recruited to movements, and what determines the kind of personal transformation they undergo in the process?

Much of what happens to social movements can be understood on the basis of a continuing tension between forces pressing toward different kinds of success. One set of forces presses toward realization of the movement's *values* in transforming the society—the achievement of peace, interracial brotherhood and sisterhood, or an unblemished natural environment. But the *power* needed to achieve tangible results has its own dynamic, and there are inevitably decision points where some of the movement's goals and ideology must be compromised or jettisoned in order to achieve power. The enjoyment and exhilaration of *participating* in a movement become ends in themselves for many adherents, who then exert pressures in directions that may undermine both the values and the power of the movement. This trichotomy of value orientations, power orientations, and participation

orientations will be used as a major organizing principle in our analysis of social movements. The emphasis will be on the directions that each orientation gives to a movement, and the tensions among them.

In the next chapter we shall elaborate some of these distinctive features of social movements seen as collective behavior. But before we close this chapter, we must review another widely used approach that is partially derived from the collective behavior tradition and sometimes mistakenly identified as a definitive statement of this tradition. However, it is an approach that departs from the collective behavior tradition in crucial respects.

Smelser's Value-Added Approach. A decade and a half before the resource mobilization approach was formulated, Neil Smelser combined elements from the collective behavior tradition with elements from the structure-functionalism of Talcott Parsons.²³ The theory addressed five kinds of collective behavior, called panic, craze, hostile outburst, norm-oriented movement, and value-oriented movement. Anchoring his approach in structure-functionalism, Smelser finds *structural strain* at the root of all collective behavior. Structural strain is not a sense of grievance, a sense of injustice, frustration, or other subjective response, but some failure of the parts of the social order to work together *in harmony*. The parts in question are called *components of social action*. They consist of *values*, or quite general ideas like freedom and equality; *norms*, or rules that serve to make values more specific; *mobilization* into organized roles, so that implementing values in specific ways becomes the responsibility of identified categories of people; and *situational facilities*, referring to the techniques and resources for carrying out the roles. Each component is further broken down into seven levels of specificity that we need not list here. Two points must be understood. First, changes at the more specific levels can usually be made without disturbing the more general levels, but changes at the more general levels always require that changes be made at all of the more specific levels. Second, where malfunctions cannot be rectified at the level where they occur, the solution requires changes at a more general level followed by implementing changes at more specific levels. Collective behavior occurs when strains at one level of specificity are addressed at a higher level of gen-

erality, but without making the necessary implementing changes at each level back down to the level where the strain occurred. "... they develop a belief which 'short-circuits' from a very generalized component *directly* to the focus of strain." An example might be the effort to deal with atmospheric pollution by prohibiting the use of polluting energy sources (norm) without addressing the practical problem of developing alternate energy sources. Since short-circuiting is unrealistic, collective behavior is always founded on irrational belief, according to Smelser.

While structural strain is *necessary*, it is not *sufficient* to produce collective behavior. A shared *generalized belief* must also arise to guide the collective response. The generalized belief incorporates the fantasy solution for short-circuiting the orderly process of reconstructing the conditions underlying strain. But even with structural strain and an appropriate generalized belief, collective behavior will not occur unless background conditions are suitable, unless conditions are *structurally conducive* to the development of collective behavior. Furthermore, there must be a *precipitating incident* or incidents, and people must be *mobilized for action* in the name of the generalized belief. Finally, the incipient and developing collective behavior must cope effectively with *social control* efforts taken by authorities against the collective behavior. Individually, these six conditions are all necessary but not sufficient to produce collective behavior. Smelser calls these six conditions in combination the *value-added* process.

Social movements, as distinct from riots (hostile outbursts) and other less developed forms of collective behavior, occur when the generalized belief indicates that a problem must be solved by changing laws or the agencies that enforce them (norm-oriented movement), or by changing values (value-oriented movement). Each of the essential conditions is met differently for movements than for other forms of collective behavior.

The list of six essential conditions for collective behavior has been the most widely used aspect of this work. The value-added process does not provide us with a true theory because each condition is nonspecific and because the conditions are not independent of each other. For example, one cannot test the hypothesis about structural conduciveness until just what is and is not conducive to the occurrence of a

norm-oriented movement has been specified. Again, since structural conduciveness includes some of the conditions that foster mobilization, it is not possible to test the hypothesis that a movement will not develop if only five of the six conditions are present. But the six conditions have been useful as a checklist to remind investigators not to overlook any of these elements, especially the previously underemphasized interaction between the movement and social control agents.

The idea of *structural* strain as deviation from a normally functionally integrated society and the assumption that collective behavior can be distinguished from institutional behavior by its irrational short-circuiting of orderly processes for problem solving are both quite serious departures from the collective behavior tradition. As we have observed earlier in this volume, collective behaviorists assume a more loosely organized society, fraught with competition and conflict and held together largely by both mutual and nonmutual accommodations. Since society is monopolistic, it continues to operate in spite of widespread contradiction and inefficiency. Furthermore, while unrealism and irrationality do play a part in social movements, we assume that they loom equally large in institutional behavior.

In short, Smelser advanced the collective behavior tradition through his perceptive analyses of movement dynamics, based on a rich and profound understanding of historical materials, and he summarized the well known conditions leading to social movements in a useful set of six categories. But his structural-functional assumptions about the organization of society and his identification of collective behavior as distinctly less rational than institutional behavior are alien to the mainstream collective behavior tradition.

NOTES

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